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Marine Reserves:  Will They Accomplish
More With Management Costs?
CLAIRE W. ARMSTRONG
SIV REITHE
University of Tromsø, Norway
Abstract  Hannesson (Marine Resource Economics 13(3) 1998) takes a critical
approach to marine protected areas (MPAs) using simulations of MPAs com-
bined with open access. His results show the conservation effect of an MPA of
an appropriate size being the same as that achieved with optimal quota regula-
tion, but with a smaller catch. We expand this analysis by adding a management
cost function and increasing the fishing costs to a more realistic level. It is
shown that the use of MPAs of certain sizes can be a more advantageous man-
agement tool than traditional quotas; hence, the inclusion of management costs
modifies some of the findings of Hannesson (1998). We also illustrate how sensi-
tive the results are to the choice of fishing cost values, making the attractiveness
of private property versus marine reserves much less clear than proposed by
Hannesson (1998).
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Introduction
In this paper, we comment upon a paper by Hannesson (1998) where he presents a
simple and elegant biomass model for a fish stock migrating between two areas, one
a protected area, the other not. Hannesson (1998) compares, by simulation, open ac-
cess (OA) in the entire distribution area of a stock, open access outside a marine
protected area (MPA), and optimal fishing throughout the entire area. His results in-
dicate that the benefits from using MPAs in combination with OA in fisheries man-
agement are critically dependent on the migration rate of fish from the reserve to the
adjacent fishing grounds. He also shows that a marine reserve of an appropriate size
relative to the migration rate will achieve the same conservation effect as optimal
fishing throughout the area, but with a smaller catch. His main point is an expansion
upon an issue presented by Holland and Brazee (1996), where it is argued that as
long as there are no limitations on fishing outside the protected area, MPAs them-
selves will not maximize economic rents in a fishery. This due to the fact that a rise
in yield will lead to increased effort eating up any rents in the fishery.
This latter issue is clear and uncontestable. Our main contention with this work
is: (1) the choice of harvest cost value, and (2) the disregard for management costs.
We show that taking these two issues into account affects the relative results of the
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different management regimes. We find that Hannesson’s (1998) results depend
critically upon the harvest cost parameter value, which he admits to setting rather
low. Furthermore, optimal harvesting strategies normally require substantial re-
search, data collection, and monitoring of effort and catches in the fishery, activities
which are costly and should be included in the calculation of optimal stock and har-
vest levels. Thus, when comparing private property with a marine reserve combined
with open access,1 the former management comes at a cost.2
In the few existing works on the modeling of management costs (Sutinen and
Andersen 1985; Anderson and Lee 1996; Arnason 1999), it is suggested that these
costs somehow are a function of the difference between the catch level, the manager,
and industry desire. Although the level of detail included in the models varies
greatly, the principal results of these studies are that including management costs
will result in an optimal stock level that is lower than in the case when management
costs are ignored, but higher than in the open-access case. The effect on profits will
depend on the stock effect, price, and how the management cost function is formu-
lated.
We shall assume that management costs increase with an increasing difference
in the stock level desired by the manager and that corresponding to open access,
which is a modified form of the function suggested by Arnason (1999).3 The basis
for the assumption is that in order to increase the fish stock above the open access
level, some form of enforcement must be applied to reduce harvesting, hence invok-
ing costs (Sutinen and Anderson for a formal presentation). The larger the stock is
above the open-access level, the greater the enforcement required.
In the next section, we present a model combining Hannesson’s (1998) MPA
model and the modified version of Arnason’s (1999) management cost model. We
then compare the different management regimes studied in Hannesson (1998). The
Results section shows that, given the inclusion of management costs, a private prop-
erty regime may not always be the preferable management strategy. We also illus-
trate that by varying the choice of harvest cost parameter values in Hannesson’s
(1998) model, we can obtain more or less the same results regarding stock size and
harvest for the different management regimes. A discussion of the results concludes
the paper.
The Model
The following bioeconomic model is identical to Hannesson’s (1998) marine re-
serves model, with a modified version of Arnason’s (1999) management cost model
added on. We use these models to study four management regimes: (i) Open access
(OA); (ii) Private property (PP); (iii) Private property with management cost (PPC);
and (iv) Marine reserves with open access (MR).
1 In situations where many parties play a role in the choice of fisheries policy, open access could be a
way of “selling” a marine reserve to interest groups who would oppose private property management.
Nonetheless, it is clear that since private property is possible, private property outside the marine re-
serve should also be an option. Due to this paper being a comment to Hannesson’s (1998) paper, such an
expansion is outside the scope of this work.
2 The assumption of zero management costs for marine reserves may seem somewhat strong, as it is
clear that control of the reserve area may involve some cost. However, with the possibility of satellite
tracking, these costs may be presumed to be minimal as compared to the costs involved in controlling
output.
3 The modification of Arnason’s (1999) model consists of using stock level as a variable instead of har-
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We will start by defining the model for the marine reserve (MR). Here, So is de-
fined as the density of fish in the fishable area, while Sm is the equivalent in the re-
serve. The size of the reserve is m, leaving the area outside the reserve to be (1 – m).
The rate with which the fish move is defined as z.
The rate of change in the density of fish in the fishable area is thus:
dS
dt
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The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) describes the growth in the fish-
able area, while the second term expresses the net migration to the fishable area, and
Y is the harvest. The net migration expression is determined as follows. The prob-
ability of fish migrating out of the fishable area is m, and the moving fish in this
area is z(1 – m)So. Hence, the total migration out of the fishable area is mz(1 – m)So.
In order to keep to our density measures, we divide by the size of the fishable area
(1 – m), and the density of the fish migrating out of the fishable area becomes mzSo,
which is the negative expression in the second term in equation (1). The equivalent
is calculated for the density of fish migrating out of the reserve into the fishable
area.
Assuming p is the unit price and c/So is the unit cost of harvest, we obtain the
objective function:
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The open access (OA) and private property cases (PP and PPC) can be modeled
as follows. The density of the stock is here defined as S, while the other parameters
are as for the MR case. This gives us the objective function for the PPC case:
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where the last term describes management costs. The management costs are a func-
tion of the difference between the total stock size, S, and the open-access stock size,
SOA .. , with β  being a positive constant. Arnason (1999) suggests that management
costs be formulated as a positive function of the absolute difference in the level of
harvest desired by the sole manager (Y(S)) and the harvest resulting from open ac-
cess [Y(SO.A.)]. We use the corresponding stock levels for simplicity. In the PP case,
β  is set equal to zero. For the OA regime, we observe that the last term in equation
(3) equals zero, and the stock size becomes equal to c for a unit price.
Hannesson (1999) finds management costs in Iceland, Norway, and Newfound-
land ranging from approximately 2.5% (Iceland) to more than 25% (Newfoundland)
of catch value in the period 1989–96. Arnason (1999) claims that fisheries manage-
ment costs lie between 5 and 30% of the landed value. OECD (2000) shows that in
1997, management costs in OECD countries varied from 2 to 90% of the value of
the catch of marine fisheries. Management costs here include administration, re-
search, and monitoring. Based on the above, we have calculated a maximum β  value
of 0.048 for our model (see the appendix).
By using a c = 0.15, Hannesson (1998) obtains a unit profit of almost 75% per-Armstrong and Reithe 168
cent of the price for the PP case.4 This seems unreasonably high for most fisher-
ies.5 We have increased the costs to c = 0.6. This still gives a unit profit of 25%,
which is probably still high compared to the reality of many fisheries. This mark-
edly changes some of Hannesson’s most central results.
Results
In the following, we present the results of several simulations using the different
management regimes.6 Introducing management costs when the harvest cost is kept
at the original low level (c = 0.15) has little effect on the results obtained by
Hannesson (1998). The inclusion of management costs resulted in only a slight re-
duction in optimal stock level and an increase in catch compared to the PP case (fig-
ures 1 and 2). Given that it is desirable to have a large optimal stock and harvest, the
PPC case, therefore, yields better results than the MR case for most reserve sizes
(m) and migration rates (z), as long as c is low, since we observe both higher optimal
stock size and larger harvests.
In figure 3, we study the effects of varying the rate of migration, z, when the
harvesting cost parameter, c, is increased to 0.6. In this case, the PPC strategy gives
a higher stock level than the MR strategy only when the migration rate is higher
than about 0.3. Also, the PPC stock size is approximately 10% greater than for the
MR case, at most. The catch and the exploitation rate (Y/S) in the MR case is lower
than that of the PPC case for all values of z and m less than approximately 0.4 and
0.35, respectively. However, the differences are not great. Note that the OA strategy
gives the highest harvest, at the cost of the stock level.
Figure 4 shows the effect of introducing management costs when varying the
size of the reserve, m, given that the harvest cost parameter is increased to 0.6. The
MR case gives a higher stock level and conservation effect for all reserve sizes
above approximately m = 0.55, while catch level is lower than for the PPC case for
all reserve sizes above approximately m = 0.5. The PP case yields better results than
the MR case for most values of m and z, irrespective of the value of the harvest cost
parameter c. The OA case, again, gives the highest harvest at the cost of the stock
level. It can be shown that as the value of β  is reduced, the PPC case naturally be-
comes more and more similar to the PP case. Still, reducing the value of β  to 0.032
in the high-cost case (corresponding to management costs equal to 20% of the catch
value), does not make it necessary to reject the idea of using MPAs in the manage-
ment. In this case, the PPC and the MR cases will generate equal results when m and
z take on the values of approximately 0.6 and 0.2, respectively.
Another feature that may be observed when changing c, is that a conclusion re-
garding optimal management strategy in the area where PPC and MR yield similar
results, is more sensitive to changes in the values of m and z when c is kept at a low
level. This point is readily observed if one compares figure 1 to figure 4 and figure 3
to figure 2. Small changes in m or z in the low-cost case (figures 1 and 2) cause
large changes in the relative stock and harvest levels; whereas, the corresponding
changes in the high-cost case (figures 3 and 4) result in smaller differences. This
feature is strengthened as either harvesting or management costs increase.
4 Hannesson (1998) did present variations in c, but uses these observations mainly to discuss the effects
of low values of c.
5 For instance, in one of the more efficient fisheries in the world, the Norwegian cod trawl fishery,
Armstrong and Flaaten (1991) obtain a unit profit of 50% in an optimal fishery.
6 The software package Excel was used for the simulations.Comment: Marine Reserves 169
Figure 1.  Effects of Varying Rates of Reserve Size m
(c = 0.15; z = 0.5; r = 0,2; β  = 0.035)Armstrong and Reithe 170
Figure 2. Effects of Varying Rates of Migration z
(c = 0.15; m = 0.4; r = 0.2; β  = 0.035)Comment: Marine Reserves 171
Figure 3. Effects of Varying Rates of Migration z
(c = 0.6; m = 0.4; r = 0.2; β  = 0.048)Armstrong and Reithe 172
Figure 4. Effects of Varying Reserve Size m
(c = 0.6; z = 0.5; r = 0.2; β  = 0.048)Comment: Marine Reserves 173
Discussion
One of Hannesson’s (1998) main points is that marine reserves combined with open-
access management do not differ much from a pure open-access management in that
both regimes give low catches, have a low degree of efficiency (Y/S), and have low
stock levels. We show that these results depend critically on the choice of harvest
cost. Hannesson (1998) runs simulations with low costs (c = 0.15) relative to price
(p = 1), and obtains the above results. In our simulations, we use a higher, more re-
alistic (we believe) cost (c = 0.6), and obtain the result that the private property (PP)
stock size is seldom more than 25% larger than the marine reserve (MR) stock size.
However, Hannesson (1998) obtains a PP stock that is, at most, more than three
times as large as the MR stock. The relative difference in the catch is also much re-
duced in our case compared to Hannesson (1998).
We show that for varying reserve size m, the choice of higher harvesting costs
results in the PP regime yielding lower harvests than all other regimes, except for a
marine reserve greater than 80% of the fishable area, or with a migration rate lower
than approximately 0.07.
In the case of high harvesting costs, an inclusion of management costs reduces
the attractiveness of a PP regime versus an MR regime even further, as smaller ma-
rine reserves are required in order for the two regimes to give similar results. When
c was set at a low level, and with a migration rate, z, of 0.5, the marine reserve had
to be as large as 80–90% of the entire fishing area in order for the MR case to yield
the same results as the PPC case (figure 1). For a marine reserve with a size of 0.4,
the MR case is less attractive than the PPC case in terms of catch and stock levels
for all values of z (figure 2). When the harvesting cost parameter is increased to 0.6,
the PPC and MR cases yield similar results when the reserve size, m, and the migra-
tion rate, z, are approximately 0.55 and 0.35, respectively (figures 3 and 4). When
comparing the PPC and the MR cases, increasing the value of c also makes any con-
clusions regarding optimal management strategy less sensitive to changes in the val-
ues of m and z.
The inclusion of management costs, combined with more realistic harvest costs,
reduces the unattractiveness of marine reserves combined with open access com-
pared to private property, as presented by Hannesson (1998). Relatively small re-
serves can be combined with open-access harvesting outside the reserve, without re-
sulting in sacrificed harvest and stock size, as compared with the PP case. Thus, the
possibility of the acceptance of marine reserves as a management tool among both
managers and users seems more probable.
In this study, the issue of rents has not been discussed, other than to state the
fact that private property has the potential to create rent, while marine reserves com-
bined with open access dissipate rent. This is in line with Hannesson’s (1998) analy-
sis, where objectives such as conservation and harvest amount are held up as a way
to compare the two management options. In the light of experiences from the man-
agement of fisheries, this is not an unacceptable approach. In fisheries where efficiency-
ensuring measures have been implemented, such as ITQ policies in Iceland, Australia,
and New Zealand, political acceptance has often required that the full rents from the
fisheries not be extracted from the users. Hence, the rents in the fishery remain, to a
large degree, amongst the users, making the difference between a managed and an
open-access fishery from a manager’s point of view, consist of the potential harvest
amount and the stock size or health. Nonetheless, work that explicitly takes into ac-
count objectives other than rent are clearly important future studies.7
7 See Skonhoft and Johannesen (2000) for a model where stock size is explicitly defined as an objective.Armstrong and Reithe 174
In many developing country fisheries, management costs are currently nonexist-
ent. In some fisheries, efficient management is difficult to imagine due to the large
number of fishers and landing sites. The “more or less” open-access aspect of the
fishery may also have important social functions, in the shape of employment and
habitation, which may to some degree compensate for the loss in rents. The imple-
mentation of management regimes, such as private property, would presumably re-
quire extensive monitoring and the introduction of management costs. In some such
fisheries, an MPA may be a better alternative. These issues also relate to industrial
fisheries. It is also clear that the use of MPAs as a hedge against shocks or natural
fluctuations may increase the viability of the fisheries (Sumaila 1998). This, and the
issue of combining marine reserves with management regimes other than open ac-
cess, is something the authors plan to follow up in future work.
References
Anderson, L.G., and D.R. Lee. 1986. Optimal Governing Instrument, Operation
Level, and Enforcement in Natural Resource Regulation: The Case of the Fish-
ery. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68(August):678–90.
Armstrong, C., and O. Flaaten. 1991. The Optimal Management of a Transboundary
Fish Resource: The Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock. Essays on the Economics of
Migratory Fish Stocks, R. Arnason and T. Bjørndal, eds., pp.137–51. Germany:
Springer-Verlag.
Arnason, R. 1999. Costs of Fisheries Management: Theoretical and Practical Impli-
cations. Fiskeriøkonomiske småskrifter. Hefte 38.
Hannesson, R. 1998. Marine Reserves: What Would They Accomplish? Marine Re-
source Economics 13(3):159–170.
_. 1999. A Comparison Between Management Costs in Iceland, Norway, and New-
foundland. Papers on Fisheries Economics 38:52–58. Centre for Fisheries Eco-
nomics, The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
Holland, D.S., and R.J. Brazee. 1996. Marine Reserves for Fisheries Management.
Marine Resource Economics 11(3):157–71.
OECD, 2000. Transition to Responsible Fisheries. Paris: OECD.
Skonhoft, A., and A.B. Johannesen. 2000. On the Overgrazing Problem (in Norwe-
gian). Norsk Økonomisk Tidskrift 114(2):151–66.
Sumaila, U.R. 1998. Protected Marine Reserves as Fisheries Management Tools: A
Bioeconomic Analysis. Fisheries Research 37:287–96.
Sutinen, J.G, and P. Andersen. 1985. The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement.
Land Economics 61(4):387–97.
Appendix
The management costs levels found by Arnason (1999), Hannesson (1999), and the
OECD (2000) are, of course, given the respective management regimes, stock lev-
els, and harvesting rates. Hence, it is not obvious for which levels of the two latter
variables their findings are applicable to in this setting. We have, therefore, calcu-
lated the value of β  both for the low (c = 0.15) and high (c = 0.6) cost case when the
management cost term in equation (3) is assumed to be 10, 20, or 30% of the corre-
sponding harvest value. In table A1, we show the values of m and z for which the
PPC and the MR cases generate similar results for the given β  values.Comment: Marine Reserves 175
Table A1
Different Values of β  and the Corresponding Values of m and z
for which the PPC and MR Cases Yield Similar Results
PPC ≈  MR
Management
Costs as % of Stock Harvest Yield Per Recruit
Harvest
c Value β m a z b m a z b m a z b
0.15 10 0.012 0.85 - - - 0.8 0.15
20 0.023 0.85 - - - 0.8 0.15
30 0.035 0.8 0 - - 0.75 0.2
0.6 10 0.016 0.75 0 0.7 0.1 0.75 0.1
20 0.032 0.65 0.15 0.6 0.25 0.65 0.2
30 0.048 0.55 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.35
Note: Cells marked “-” indicate that the PPC case always yields better results than the MR case.
a Given that z = 0.5
b Given that m = 0.4